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International Operations:
Current Antitrust Environment
Henry T. King, Jr. *
T HE U.S. AND FOREIGN antitrust environment, with respect
to international operations, is a broad subject indeed. Ac-
cordingly, this comment will only touch upon the major trends as
they seem to be developing.
Broadly speaking, in Europe, we are fully into the age of
Schlieder. Willy Schlieder, the Common Market's Director of
Competition, is in full charge, and the patterns that seem to be
developing are representative of his views. Developments of sig-
nificance are taking place in the field of industrial pricing by
dominant companies. Many of the attacks against certain business
practices are against foreign firms not based in the Common Mar-
ket, and this fact should not be overlooked.
In the German area, the Cartel Authority is taking a hard-
nosed approach on acquisitions of German companies by foreign
firms, so that for acquisitions of any magnitude by large outside
firms, absent special circumstances, the door has finally been
closed. The German Cartel Authority is also developing its view
of joint ventures and is attacking even more forcefully the matter of
industrial pricing by companies which are dominant in the field.
In the United States, there have been no dramatic develop-
ments of general interest. There have been some indications by at
least one key official of the Department of Justice that, in his
personal view on proposed projects with the Soviet Union, where
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one U.S. enterprise is competing with another, they may exchange
price information, but this has not been crystallized into a formal
pronouncement.1 Moreover, this same antitrust official indicated,
in a dicussion involving the application of the U.S. antitrust laws
to joint ventures between competing foreign and U.S. firms with
respect to the Soviet Union, that in some instances there might be
circumstances where the size of the project, or other special facts
such as cost and risk, might justify a sympathetic Department of
Justice view of a particular joint venture. But it should be empha-
sized that these were the personal views of the particular official
and should not be taken as a basis for corporate action. The
Gillette case, 2 which involved a challenge to the acquisition of a
foreign firm by a U.S. company, is now being settled by a proposed
consent judgment, which is unusual in its terms. The Westing-
house-Mitsubishi case, 3 involving a Department of Justice challenge
to a massive licensing arrangement, still has not gone to trial.
In the developing world, antitrust laws are few and far be-
tween, but there are many regulations which delimit the possible
perimeters of licensing arrangements, particularly between U.S.
parents and foreign subsidiaries. These regulations are worthy
of mention.
In Australia, a comprehensive antitrust law has been passed.4
In Canada, the first phase of a new antitrust law with teeth will
probably go into effect before the end of the year.5 A second wave
of amendments strengthening Canada's legislation in the antitrust
area is expected shortly.6
See comments of Douglas Rosenthal, Assistant Chief, Foreign Commerce Sec-
tion, U.S. Department of Justice, at Meeting of Advisory Committee on East/
West Trade, June 11, 1975, particularly at 95, 102-103, 105-106, and 108-109.
2 United States v. Gillette Co., 40 Fed. Reg. 27265 (1975); 5 TRADE REG.
REp. (1976-1 Trade Cas.) 60,691, at 67,996 (D.C. Mass. Dec. 30, 1975); 5
TRADE REG. REP. (1975-2 Trade Cas.) 60,651, at 67,838 (D.C. Mass. Dec. 30,
1975). Infra notes 7, 13, at 125, 126.
3 United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Mitsubishi Electric Corp.,
and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,312, at 97,999
(N.D.Cal. Feb. 15, 1974); 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,712, at 95,148 (N.D.Cal.
Sept. 7, 1973); 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,361, at 93,678 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 5, 1973);
appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 811 (1974).
4 Trade Practices Act (1974).
5 Combines Investigation Act/CAN. REV. STAT. c. 23 (1970), as amended by
Bill C-2. Further amendments are still in drafting stage.
6 Id.
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I. INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
EEC
In looking at this subject, at least five fundamental points
should be considered in connection with the evaluation of license
agreements under the EEC's competition rules:
(1) No violation of the EEC rules exists unless trade be-
tween two or more member states is affected;
(2) Economically insignificant restraints on trade would not
be deemed a violation;
(3) Even if a violation of Article 85(1) of the Rome Treaty 7
would otherwise exist, in appropriate cases, an exemption can
be given by the Commission under Article 85(3);
7 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done at Rome,
March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 151, at 201.
Article 85 of the Treaty reads:
1. The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common
Market and shall hereby be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises,
any decisions by associations of enterprises and any concerted practices which
are likely to affect trade between the Member States and which have as their
object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the Common Market, in particular those consisting in:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other
trading conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development
or investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a
party of additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to com-
mercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contract.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be null
and void.
3. Nevertheless, the provisions of paragraph 1 may be declared inapplicable
in the case of:
- any agreements or classes of agreements between enterprises,
- any decisions or classes of decisions by associations of enterprises, and
- any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices which contribute
to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the promo-
tion of technical or economic progress while reserving to users an equitable share
in the profit resulting therefrom, and which:
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not in-
dispensable to the attainment of the above objectives;
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of a sub-
stantial proportion of the goods concerned. 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48; 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 2005, 2031, 2051, at 1631, 1657, 1661. A full discussion of
the impact of Articles 85 and 86 on Common Market antitrust law is found in
Deringer, Current Trends of EEC Competition Policy, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 203
(1973). Article 85(1) and its development in Common Market case law are
discussed in Note, 6 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 163 (1973).
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(4) If trade between two or more member states is likely to
be affected in an economically significant fashion, the EEC
Commission may well consider Article 85(1) applicable even to
an agreement where the licensee, or both the licensor and the
licensee are established outside the Common Market;
(5) In certain cases individual clauses may be declared il-
legal even though such a clause would, in principle, be per-
mitted. Thus, a requirement that the licensee manufacture a
certain quantity might, in an individual case, be designed to
preclude the licensee from manufacturing a competing product,
or have that effect.
The following are two clearly established trends:
(1) With respect to transfer of technology, the Commis-
sion is determined to consider the licensor and licensee as actual
or potential competitors, and thus to condemn under Article 85
all clauses which do not relate to the essence of the property right,
fairly narrowly defined, and which at the same time restrict the
ability of the licensee and the licensor to compete freely.
(2) With respect to enforcement of industrial property
rights (whether patents, trademarks or others), the Commission
will do what it can to limit such enforcement that would be con-
trary to the rules of the Rome Treaty on the free circulation of
goods, principally contained in Articles 30 and 36.8
In a recent case 9 concerning an exclusive patent and know-
how license agreement between a French and German firm, the
Commission restated its position with respect to license agree-
ments. The Commission, in analyzing the exclusivity clause, said
that the restriction on the freedom of the licensor to grant other
licenses in the territory was "not of the essence of the patent"
and the prohibition of its unauthorized use. 10 Thus it was a clause
8 Article 30 of the Treaty reads:
Quantitative restrictions on importation and all measures with equivalent
effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, hereby be prohibited
between Member States. 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 26; 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
321, at 451. Article 36 of the Treaty reads:
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 inclusive shall not be an obstacle to
prohibitions or restrictions in respect of importation, exportation or transit which
are justified on grounds of public morality, public order, public safety, the
protection of human or animal life or health, the preservation of plant life, the
protection of national treasures of artistic, historical or archeological value or
the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or
restrictions shall not, however, constitute either a means of arbitrary discrimina-
tion or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. 298 U.N.T.S.
11, 29; 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 351, at 463.
9 Re Kabelmetal's Agreement, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. D40, [1975] O.J. L222/34
(E.C. Comm. - 75/494, 18 July 1975).
10 Id. O.J. at L222/36 and 37.
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prohibited under Article 85(1) if an appreciable restraint on com-
petition existed. Here the Commission found that the exclusivity
was necessary to encourage the licensee to make the large initial
investment and facilitate his orderly entry into the market. Fur-
thermore, the license was limited in time since it would expire in
1977. Therefore, the Commission granted an exemption.
In sum, an exclusive license would not be valid if an appreciable
restraint on competition resulted from strength of the patent, or
from the market share held by the licensee or other exclusive
licensees of the patent. Exclusivity is more likely to be permitted
if it concerns only manufacturing or if the exclusivity is limited in
time and substantial interbrand competition exists.
The trend is toward having the rules of the Rome Treaty and
the free circulation of goods prevail over the enforcement of in-
dustrial property rights." The right of the patent holder to bring
an infringement suit to stop direct imports from his licensees into
a territory which the patent holder meant to reserve for himself is
still not prejudged by any court decision, although the Commis-
sion is, I understand, in favor of having the rules of free move-
ment of goods prevail. Thus, ownership of a patent in another
EEC country perhaps can, still be used to prevent direct exports
by licensees. But export prohibitions are not allowed in license
agreements with respect to exports to EEC countries. Further-
more, export prohibitions might not be allowed with respect to
non-EEC countries if, as a result of special circumstances, trade
between member states was affected.
II. ACQUISITIONS
United States
(A) Foreign Acquisitions Under the U.S. Antitrust Laws
In the early summer of 1967, Gillette acquired Braun A.G., a
West German company. Gillette was at that time engaged in
the manufacture of wet shaving equipment, and Braun was en-
gaged in the manufacture of electric shaving equipment. Braun
had a licensing and marketing agreement with the Ronson Com-
pany covering the licensing and distribution of Braun electric
shavers in the United States.
The Department of Justice in 1968 said that the acquisition
11 See generally Glaser, Restrictions on Competition in Patent Licenses and Their
Treatment Under American and German Law, 9 TEX. INT'L L. J. 51 (1974), for a similar
treatment of industrial property rights by German antitrust law.
[Vol. 8: 452
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"substantially lessened" competition under Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act. 12
Gillette had over 50 percent of the safety razor blade market
in the wet shaving market and Braun was in the dry shaving mar-
ket. Gillette contended that the two markets were not directly
competitive.
The Department of Justice persevered and, since that time, the
case has been pending. In June 1975, the parties agreed on a
proposed consent decree for settling the case. 13
Under this decree, Gillette agreed to form a new corporation
to produce and market electric shavers in the United States.
Gillette and Braun agreed to give the new company their shaving
instrument technology and know-how as well as Braun's U.S.
patent rights.
Gillette and Braun have agreed to give the capital, manpower,
and business services needed to make the new company operative.
In addition, they are to supply Braun supervisory and technical
personnel. Gillette must invest $2.5 million in the new company.
The new company must reinvest all earnings and pay no dividends
for 5 years. After 4 years, Gillette must divest itself of all interest
in the new company.
Gillette was forbidden for a 10-year period from making any
acquisitions in the dry or wet shaving equipment market without
prior approval from the Justice Department and the court.
This is the most recent case in which the right of the Depart-
ment of Justice to intervene in a foreign acquisition was recog-
nized, although here there was no final judicial determination of
the merits of the case, and there was a real question as to how
much effect the acquisition had on competition in the United
States. The government alleged that Braun was eliminated as a
potential competitor in the U.S. shaving instrument industry and
argued that Gillette's position in the industry would be enhanced
by the acquisition. The settlement was entered into by Gillette,
despite the fact that there was no firm evidence (in Gillette's
view) that Braun was planning an independent entry into the
U.S. electric shaving market. Moreover, there was an open ques-
tion as to whether, since Braun was in the dry shaving equipment
market and Gillette was in the wet, Gillette's acquisition would
12 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), formerly ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat. 631
(1914).
13 United States v. Gillette Co., supra note 2.
1976]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
have "substantially lessened" competition in the market in which
Gillette was operating.
The settlement did call for Gillette to keep the non-electric
shaver parts of Braun's business in the United States and through-
out the world. (In the original complaint the government had
asked that Gillette divest itself of Braun altogether.)
In my opinion, since the case was not litigated to a judicial
conclusion, it does not represent definitive precedent on this
general subject matter. It was terminated by a consent decree
tailored to the facts of the particular case at hand.
(B) Acquisitions in Germany
In late 1974, the German Cartel Authority forbade the acquisi-
tion of the German company Karl Hahn GMBH by Johnson &
Johnson, a U.S. company. Hahn was a German manufacturer
of tampons and had 80 percent of the relevant market. There
were two other producers in the German market. Hahn's revenue
from its sale of tampons was six times as high as its main competi-
tor, and nine times as high as the next competitor.
The Cartel Authority laid great emphasis on the fact that
Johnson & Johnson had great financial power and know-how.
In addition, the two firms combined to have great financial re-
sources and strong common research potential.
The Cartel Authority held that, as a result of the acquisition,
the barriers for entrance of other competitors into the market
would be increased and that chances in the future for the revival
of any competition were dim. With this in mind, the Cartel
Authority asked for the divestiture by Johnson & Johnson of Karl
Hahn. The case is now on appeal.
This was the first attempt by a multinational company to
enter Germany via the acquisition route after the passage of
the amended German cartel law. 14 It is felt that in refusing this,
the Federal Cartel Authority hopes to avoid subsequent acquisi-
tions of other German companies by foreign firms.15
14 The original German Cartel Law, Law Against Restraints of Competition,
was passed on July 27, 1957, [1957] BGB1. I, 1081. It was amended in 1965,
[1965] BGB1. I, 1363, and again in 1973, [1973] BGB1. I, 917. The existing
Cartel Law (i.e., the fully amended Law of July 27, 1957) is found at 3 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 23, 501-23, 516, at 23, 501-23, 511-3. For a full discussion
of the unamended Law of July 27, 1957 see Schapiro, The German Law Against
Restraints of Competition - Comparative and International Aspects, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 201 (1962).
Is For a general discussion of merger control in Germany, see Brun, Anti-
[Vol. 8:452
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(C) Acquisitions in Common Market
The Commission authorized a merger of steel companies in the
United Kingdom where both companies were engaged in the
manufacture of, among other things, wire products.16 The Com-
mission found that merger would not deter competition in the
market for steel products. This had to be reviewed by the Com-
mission because it involved the coal and steel industry. Other-
wise, there would have been no prior Commission review and
clearance.
Thus far, there is no merger control regulation which has been
adopted by the EEC, even though there have been several at-
tempts to secure the adoption of one. 17 The Commission is having
a hard time getting the member states to agree on the proposed
terms.
It should be noted, however, that despite the inability of the
Commission to get an agreement between the member states on a
merger regulation, the EEC has successfully asserted its ability
to control mergers under Article 8618 of the Rome Treaty in the
Continental Can case. 19
trust Policy in Europe: The Emergence of Strict Enforcement?, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L.
475, 483 and 484 (1974).
16 Commission Decision of December 5, 1974 (not published) authorizing the
acquisition by British Steel Corporation of controlling interest in Johnson &
Firth Brown Ltd. The Court of Justice rejected a demand for an injunction or a
stay of the execution of the Commission's decision in its decision of January 16,
1975; Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd. v. E.C. Commission, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 638;
[1975] E.C.R. 1 (Eur. C.J. - 3/75 R.I., 16 Jan. 1975).
17 The Proposed Concentration Regulation is treated in Comment, The
EEC's Proposal for a Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, 8 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 267 (1973).
18 Article 86 of the Treaty reads:
To the extent to which trade between any Member States may be affected
thereby, action by one or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a
dominant position within the Common Market or within a substantial part of it
shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall hereby
be prohibited.
Such improper practices may, in particular, consist in:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling
prices or of any other inequitable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, market or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a party,
of additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contract. 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
48-9; 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 2101, at 1681.
19 Europemballage and Continental Can Co. v. Commission, Court of Justice
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III. JOINT VENTURES
The EEC Commission is showing a marked and increasing
concern over the potential anticompetitive effects of joint ventures.
There is a new tendency on the part of the Commission to scruti-
nize all joint ventures which involve actual or potential competi-
tors, particularly in an oligopolistic market.20
The rules applicable to joint ventures can be summarized as
follows:
(1) The Commission's general approach is that joint ventures
cannot be used to pursue goals which would be illegal if they
were the object of a contractual arrangement.
(2) When a joint venture implies cooperation between two
companies which might otherwise be competing, it implies a re-
duction in the numbers of market participants, and is therefore
objectionable.
(3) If there is a close relationship between the activities of
the parent companies and those of the joint venture, particularly
if they are operating in the same competitive markets, there is
likely to result a series of anticompetitive effects, which the Com-
mission calls "group effect." This group effect concept describes
the tendency of the parents which cooperate at the level of the joint
venture to extend this cooperation to other markets not covered
by the joint venture. 21
The net result of the Commission's activity would seem to
of the European Communities, Case No. 6/72, Feb. 21, 1973; J.O. C68/72 (Aug.
21, 1973); 2 CCH COMM. MKET. REP. 8171, at 8279-3 (1973). See Adler and
Belman, Antimerger Enforcement in Europe - Trends & Prospects, 8 J. INT'L L. &
EcON. 31 (1973); Guyenot, The Continental Case: A European View, 8 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 107 (1974); Guyenot and Lunt, The Continental Can Decision and the
Birth of European Antitrust Laws, 2 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 69 (1973); Hurwitz, The
Impact of the Continental Can Case on Combinations and Concentrations Within the
Common Market, 25 HAST. L. J. 469 (1974); Kyros, Common Market Merger
Policy: Sources and Development, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 501 (1974); Note, Common
Market, Antitrust, 15 HARV. INT'L L. J. 333 (1974); Note, The Emergence of a
Common Market Merger Control Policy: The Aftermath of the Continental Can - The
Proposed EEC Merger Control Regulations, 7 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 131 (1974); Com-
ment, Haubert, Continental Can - New Strength for Common Market Antitrust, 11
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 227 (1973); Comment, Coleman, European Economic Com-
munity Antitrust Law: The Continental Can Decision - Forerunner of New European
Anti-Merger Policy, 47 TUL. L. REV. 829 (1972); Recent Decisions, 6 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 669 (1973). See generally Brun, supra note 16.
20 See generally Schwartz and Wellman, Jr., The Rule of Reason in EEC Anti-
trust: Efficiency Enhancement Through Integration by Agreement Among Competitors,
12 VA. J. INT'L L. 192 (1972).
21 See Note, Treacy, Common Market Antitrust Law: Jurisdiction: Limitations
Imposed by Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome, 6 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 163, 177-9 (1973).
[Vol. 8: 452
ANTITRUST ENVIRONMENT
make it exceedingly difficult for bigger companies to cooperate in
the form of a joint venture.
Currently the Commission is reviewing the Carbon Black case
- a joint venture involving Phillips Petroleum Company and
Cities Service Company.22 The result is expected to be negative
from industry's standpoint. The decision will no doubt elaborate
the Commission's views on the general subject of joint ventures,
and these may be expected to be quite restrictive, at least where
companies with strong market positions are involved.
Obviously, with regard to joint ventures, the Commission's
policies will be applied in different ways, depending upon the
activity of the joint venture, which may be engaged in research,
distribution, joint production, or a combination of these.
IV. DISTRIBUTION
There is a trend toward holding that a problem is created
under Article 85(1) 23 with even relatively minor restrictions on
the ability of a distributor to set prices as he wishes on out-of-
state sales, or to arrange his own distribution network, if, for one
reason or another, the agreement falls outside the 1967 Block
exemption on Exclusive Distribution Agreements. 24  But this
problem will be sympathetically reviewed by the Commission, if
a request for an exemption is filed.
In short, the Commission seems quite willing to condemn a
distribution agreement when the grounds for violation are not over-
whelmingly convincing, and then to grant an exemption without
requiring a particularly heavy burden of proof as to whether the
requirements for an exemption are satisfied. The result of this
trend, if indeed it exists, is that more and more frequently the
Commission becomes an agency engaged in the regular supervision
of business activity under the conditions imposed in the exemp-
tion.
V. TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS
The Commission frowns on territorial restrictions, whether in
distribution agreements, license agreements, sales conditions,
or elsewhere. Essentially it wants the member states of the EEC
22 The Commission's statement of objections in the Carbon Black case was
summarized in 1586 Europe (a daily Brussels publication) 8 (Sept. 11, 1974).
23 Supra note 7.
2 Regulation No. 67/67 of the EEC Commission of March 22, 1967. See
also 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2727, @ 1881.
1976]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
to become a single trading bloc. 25 It is succeeding to a con-
siderable extent in establishing this principle. Thus a problem
arises for companies which engage in agreements or concerted
practices that tend to prevent the flow of goods across the bound-
ary of one EEC state to another, or for a dominant company that
does virtually anything to restrain imports or exports. The GM
case now before the Court of Justice is an illustration of this
latter point.2
GM was thought to be using its position, as the sole issuer of
Belgian Certificates of Conformity for GM cars circulating in
Belgium, in order to discourage outsiders from making unofficial
imports into Belguim. GM was charging more for inspecting
and certifying such unofficial imports.
As the Commission succeeds in establishing its views on the
matter of a unified trade bloc, it can concern itself with the more
traditional problem of competition viewed in the traditional anti-
trust way, such as threats to market structure which may come
through joint ventures or mergers.
VI. PRICING
(1) Germany
(a) Merck Case
Early in 1974, the Federal Cartel Authority brought a proceeding
against Merck alleging it abused its dominant position by charg-
ing prices for its special product, vitamin B-12, two to three times
as high as prices charged by other manufacturers of the same
product. The Cartel Authority seemed to be concerned with
the question of why Merck did not adapt its prices to the far
lower prices of its competitors, although it had been losing mar-
ket shares during the last years. The approach of the Federal
Cartel Authority was that any price substantially higher than those
of competitors is to be presumed an abuse (of the producer's
dominant market position) if the producer in question cannot give
a convincing justification of its price policy. There was no clarifi-
cation of exactly what arguments could be used in justifying a
price difference. This case is currently pending on appeal
before the Supreme Civil Court of Germany.
2 See Note, Common Market Antitrust Law: Jurisdiction: Limitations Imposed
by Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome, 6 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 163 (1973). See generally
Deringer, supra note 7.
21 Re General Motors Continental NV, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. D20, [1975]
O.J. L29/14 (E.C. Commiss. - 75/75 EEC, 19 Dec. 1974).
[Vol. 8:452
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(b) Hoffman-La Roche
In mid-1974, the German Cartel Authority ordered Hoffman-
La Roche to decrease its price for valium by 40 percent and librium
by 35 percent. In its decision,27 the Federal Cartel Authority
stated that it regarded Hoffman-La Roche as market dominant,
since it believed that there was no price competition for Hoff-
man-La Roche. As evidence that no price competition existed,
the Federal Cartel Authority indicated that Hoffman-La Roche
had not changed its prices since the period of 1960 to 1963,
even though some competitors had gained substantial market
shares. It said that Hoffman-La Roche should have decreased
its prices to defend its market share, or to increase its share.
Hoffman-La Roche's defense was that during a period of over 12
years, in spite of rising costs and inflation and increases in the
quality of the product, the price had been maintained. The
Federal Cartel Authority also inferred the market dominant posi-
tion of Hoffman-La Roche by virtue of its large profits and
sizeable expenditures for research and development. In the
Cartel Authority's view, Hoffman-La Roche would not have been
able to make such expenditures for research and development if
it had not been able to recover from high prices in a non-competi-
tive market.
The Cartel Authority also found a misuse of dominant position
in the form of a price differential between the Hoffman-La Roche
products sold in Germany and the same products sold in other
member states of the Common Market. It also questioned the
allocation of Hoffman-La Roche's worldwide expenses to its sales
in Germany. Finally, in its decision, the Cartel Authority ordered
Hoffman-La Roche to reduce its prices, effective January 1, 1975.
The Hoffman-La Roche decision has been appealed to the Berlin
Court of Appeals, and this decision is expected before the end of
November.28
27 Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Dolder AG, [1975] II BGE 237 (BG, 7
June 1974).
28 The Berlin Court of Appeals sustained the German Cartel Authority in its
holding that Hoffman-La Roche had misused its dominant position but reduced
percentage-wise the alleged overprice. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
being appealed to the German Supreme Court. The retroactivity feature of
the German Cartel Authority's decision was deleted and any downward price
adjustments will only become effective upon final disposition of the case by the
German Supreme Court. The decision of the Berlin Court of Appeals has not
yet been published.
1976]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
(2) EEC
The Commission has taken a great interest in the matter of
pricing. This has been because the member states of the Com-
munity have extracted a promise from the Commission that it
will use antitrust rules so as to keep prices down. Since that
time, there have been a number of investigations aimed at lower-
ing prices. The targets for these investigations include Hoffman-
La Roche, 29 IBM,3D the oil companies, and the French pub-
lishing house, Hachette. The weapons used have been the
anticartel provisions of Article 85, and the provisions of Article 86,
which limit the activities of dominant companies. 31 Under Article
85, the Commission may move against horizontal cartels, restric-
tive sales conditions, or other means that tend to keep prices up,
particularly if they impede the ability of a party in one member
state to compete with a party in another. 32
VII. ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION
Generally, the Commission is looking closely at the behavior
of dominant companies. In particular, the Commission seems to
want to use Article 86 to control the behavior of dominant com-
panies with regard to pricing and sales conditions. 33
The Commission is looking into the practice of the Hoffman-
La Roche Company in employing its bargaining force in certain
product markets to enlarge its market share in other markets.34
The Commission is also charging United Brands with refusing to
supply traders unless they bought bananas exclusively from United
Brands, and selling at abnormally low prices to eliminate compet-
itors25
In the IBM case, the Commission is conducting an investiga-
tion in order to determine whether there is a need for controlling
29 Supra notes 27 and 28.
-3 Infra note 36.
31 Supra notes 7 and 13.
32 See generally Brun, supra note 15, at 486-90.
33 See Adler and Belman, supra note 19.
" Supra notes 27 and 28.
3 United Brands has since been fined $1,200,000 by the Commission for
such practices and was ordered to stop them. The Chiquita case, as it is known,
has not been published in the Official Journal. The case is being appealed to the
High Court of Justice.
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the behavoir of companies which compromise the ability of other
companies to establish themselves as serious competitors. 6
The new trend in regard to the control of dominant companies
under Article 86 of the Rome Treaty is for the Commission to
pursue any market practice of a dominant company, engaged in
by virtue of its dominant position, when that practice is unfair,
or where it works to the detriment of any class. 37
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
(1) In a humorous vein, it may be said that the United States,
perhaps in fulfillment of its export drive, has been exporting its
antitrust theology overseas.38 Joel Davidow, head of the Foreign
Commerce Section of the U.S. Antitrust Division, has just spent
6 weeks in the Common Market in an office next to that of Willy
Schlieder, the EEC's antitrust chief, and consultations and ex-
changes were close. An FTC man spent considerable time in
Australia, working with the Australian authorities on their new
antitrust legislation. Groundwork for exchanges between the
German Cartel Authority, and U.S. antitrust people is on the way
to becoming formalized, probably within the next year or so. Not
only ideas and concepts are exchanged, but also information on
subjects of common interest. What does all this mean over the
long haul for the foreign or U.S. businessman? It may mean that
if he is charged in one country he may also be charged in others.
For example, currently, antitrust lawyers from the member states
and the EEC meet four times a year to exchange information and
discuss actions pending or planned. The Hoffman-La Roche case
is an example, where the company was charged successively in
the United Kingdom, EEC, and Germany. In effect, this ex-
change of information, ideas, and concepts means a transnational
approach toward antitrust. This applies particularly in the case
of companies which are not indigenous to the areas involved,
and which are not indigenous to the community. This is also
true in Germany, where the Cartel Authority has used Hoffman-
La Roche and Merck to take some new initiatives, and where it
3 The opening of the IBM investigation was reported in 1568 Europe 4
(July 26, 1974).
37 See generally Brun, supra note 15.
38 For a comparison of EEC and United Kingdom antitrust developments
with American antitrust law as found particularly in Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
see Adler and Belman, supra note 19.
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used the Carl Hahn and Johnson & Johnson cases to assert its views
on the correct interpretation of the new anti-merger law.3 9
(2) In the EEC, the authorities are primarily interested in
industrial property, joint ventures, and pricing. New and sig-
nificant changes are developing for these areas. In the view of
the EEC, any company with a dominant position warrants close
scrutiny by the antitrust authorities lest it abuse that dominant
position.40
(3) In Germany, the antitrust authorities are applying their
new law4t very restrictively where joint ventures and acquisitions
are involved. Moreover, there are major initiatives in the pricing
area involving two foreign firms. The thrust of these initiatives
is that foreign firms may have to retain staff economists to justify
their prices.
(4) In Japan and the United States there have really not been
any dramatic new developments in the antitrust field. The
Gillette case42 is settled but what, if anything, is its general sig-
nificance? Suffice to say that it did not write any new law.
The Westinghouse-Mitsubishi case 43 involving licensing restrictions
still has not gone to trial, although the judge charged with hearing
it said he wants to press ahead. It has been said that the U.S.
antitrust laws do not prohibit the exchange of price information
by U.S. firms competing for business with the Soviet Union and
that, where special factors exist, it may be possible for competitors
to enter into joint ventures for very large foreign projects. But
these views have not as yet been formalized into coherent official
pronouncements. The air in this area is still cloudy and caution
remains the watchword. 44
(5) In the developing world, the problem the U.S. business-
man faces concerns primarily the conditions under which he trans-
fers his technology to his foreign licensee. Throughout the de-
veloping world, there are restrictions which apply to the transfer
of technology, and these restrictions are growing. They represent
39 Supra notes 27 and 28 respectively.
40 Supra notes 33 and 37.
41 Supra note 14.
42 United States v. Gillette Co., supra note 2.
43 United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Mitsubishi Electric Corp.,
and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., supra note 3.
44 For a general discussion of current U.S. antitrust law with regard to
multinational corporations, including comments on both the Gillette and Westing-
house-Mitsubishi cases, see Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an Inter-
national Teapot?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 16 (1974).
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a part of the changing environment in which U.S. businessmen
are dealing. They apply, to a greater or lesser extent, whether
the technology transferred is patents, know-how, trademarks, or
technical services. Further, the application of these restrictions
depends on (A) whether the royalty can, in fact, be paid; (B)
whether it is deductible for tax purposes; and, (C) in Brazil, at
least, whether it constitutes a remittance of profits. In addi-
tion, the terms on which the license can be entered into are closely
framed. Are there restrictions on exports? Are there grant
backs? Does the licensee waive the right to challenge the licen-
sor's patent? How are disputes to be settled under the license
agreement? All of the foregoing matters restrict the U.S. li-
censor's freedom of action in such countries as Brazil, 45 Argen-
tina, 46 the Andean Code Countries, 47 Mexico, 48 and other parts
of the developing world. They are part of the U.S. business-
man's course of instruction in these areas. He must not fail to heed
them.
45 See Law #5,722 of 1971 (Industrial Property Code) and Normative Act
#15, issued on September 11, 1975 by the National Institute of Industrial Prop-
erty of Brazil (INPI) dealing with license agreements between foreign firms
and Brazilian firms.
46 See 1974 Transfer of Technology Law (Law 20, 794), which replaced a
previous law enacted in 1971.
47 Regulations restricting licensors are set forth in Andean Pact Decision
24, adopted by Venezuela on September 26, 1973 and published in Gaceta
Official No. 1620 Extraordinario of November 1, 1973, Decree No. 63, regulating
same, dated April 28, 1974 and published in Gaceta Official No. 1650 Extra-
ordinario of April 29, 1974, and Decree No. 746, dated February 11, 1975 and
published in Official Gazette No. 30, 623 of February 15, 1973. 11 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 126 (1972).
48See Law for the Registration of Transfer of Technology and Use and
Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks, adopted by the Mexican Congress on
December 28, 1972 and published in the Federal Bulletin of December 30, 1972.
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